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1. Introduction 
Sweden has a substantial problem with radon, a naturally occurring radioactive, 
colorless, odorless and tasteless gas that can cause lung cancer.  There are three 
primary sources of radon (Swedish National Board of Housing and Planning 
2010b) (abbreviated as SNBHP): 
• emissions from the ground/bedrock;  
• the water from drilled wells in radon rich areas; 
• certain concrete building materials--in the period 1929-late 1970s 
Swedish building companies used so called blue concrete that is alum 
shale based and contains high levels of radium; 
 
Radon is an especially big problem in Sweden as not only do homes conform to 
strict energy conservation measures (both in terms of triple pane windows, 
cavity wall insulation and attic insulation) but also due to the cold climate  
homes have low air exchange rates as windows and doors are seldom opened 
during the heating period (Mjones et al 2009).  Exposure to radon is aggravated 
by the fact that during the long cold and dark winter months inhabitants spend 
most of their leisure hours at home (Schipper and Lichtenberg 1976; Schipper et 
al 1985).  Current binding guidelines for new built homes are set at a maximum 
of 200 Bequerels per cubic meter of air (Bq/m3) while for existing homes there 
is a recommended guideline set at 200 Bq/m3 (SNBHP 2016; The Swedish 
Public Health Agency 2014).  Yet just a few years ago, a number of Swedish 
schools reported radon levels of 3200 Bq/m3 and in a search for buildings with 
high radon levels one family home reported levels of 28,000 Bq/m3 
(Swedjemark 1988).     
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Radon gas, to which individuals are mostly exposed in their own homes, is the 
second biggest cause of lung cancer in the country (after smoking).  In one 
study (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority 2012) the Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority calculated that of the 3,500 annual lung cancer deaths some 500 cases 
are caused by the exposure to high levels of radon gas.  Most radon-induced 
lung cancers occur in those who already smoke.  One study showed that a 
smoker has approximately 25 times higher chance of getting lung cancer from 
radon than a non-smoker (Darby et al 2005; Mjones et al 2009).  In other words, 
approximately 450 of the 500 estimated annual radon-induced lung cancer 
deaths are among individuals who already smoke (Swedish National Board of 
Housing and Planning 2016). 
 
It is rather easy to prevent radon induced lung cancer (US EPA 2017).  Studies 
indicate that for every exposure of 100Bq/m3 lung cancer risk increases by 16 
percent (Darby et al 2005; see also Axelsson et al 2015). As a result, it should 
come as no surprise when the World Health Organisation (WHO) came out with 
a major study on radon noting that there should be an upper exposure limit of 
100 Bq/m3, which was 50 percent lower than the Swedish guidance in effect at 
that time (WHO 2009).  In 2010 the Swedish National Board of Housing 
Building and Planning in collaboration with five other Government Agencies 
conducted an economic analysis to see whether it would make economic sense 
to meet the WHO guidance.  It concluded that approximately 400,000 small 
domestic dwellings and 230,000 flats had radon levels between 100-200 Bq/m3 
of air, and therefore a proposed clean-up of these dwellings would affect 1.3 
million individuals.  The costs of the proposed radon clean-up were estimated at 
a one off fee of 14-19 billion SEK plus an annual cost of an additional 500 
million SEK.  These proposed measures would only save some 40 lives per 
year.  As a result the Swedish National Board of Housing and Planning rejected 
calls to reduce the upper exposure limit to 100Bqm3 air (SNBHP 2010). 
 
One of Swedish National Board of Housing and Planning’s main concerns 
historically-has been-and still is to reduce the levels of radon below 200 Bq/m3 
for all dwellings by the year 2020.  This is something that the Government 
originally asked the Agency to prioritize as clearly highlighted in the 2001 
Swedish Government Bill which states: 
“by the year 2020 all houses should not affect human health 
negatively…that radon levels in all houses by the year 2020 is lower than 
200Bq/m3 air.” (Swedish Government Bill 2001/02:1218).  
Although a number of the Government’s goals were changed somewhat in the 
it’s bill from 2010 the above one remained (Swedish Government Bill 2010). 
The aim of this paper is to examine whether the SNBHP will reach this goal by 
conducting an evaluation of its actions from a risk communication perspective.  
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Will all Swedish dwellings come in under 200Bq/m3 air by 2020 as stated in the 
Swedish Government Bill of 2001?   The paper is based on 12 face to face 
interviews with members of SNBHP in Karlskrona, Sweden as well as an 
evaluation and analysis of the grey literature (both in-house and consultant 
studies that have not undergone peer review) on the topic.  The study was 
conducted between January-June 2017. In the next section I briefly review the 
risk communication literature associated with radon, and discuss in some detail 
what the Board has done within the radon communication area with a specific 
focus on the 2005-2006 radon information/communication campaign.  This is 
followed by an analysis of what the Board did followed by a series of 
recommendations that the Board may wish to adapt going forward. 
 
2. Risk communication and radon 
There has been quite a few studies done on radon communication (Guimond 
and Page 1992).  Most of the historic radon research was funded by the United 
States Radon Program which was set up by the US Environmental Protection 
Agency in 1985 following nationwide media coverage of an individual 
triggering a radiation detector in December 1984 at a nuclear station because his 
home was contaminated by radon (Guimond and Page 1992).  This EPA and 
related research on the topic uncovered a number of reasons to why radon risk 
communication is rather difficult to do.  Among the key variables include (after 
Guimond and Page 1992, p. 170-173; also see Bostrom et al 1992; Fisher and 
Johnson 1990; Fisher and Sjoberg 1990;Fischhoff et al 1979; Sjoberg 1989; 
Slovic 1987; 1997; Smith et al 1987; Svenson and Fischhoff 1985; Weinstein et 
al 1989): 
• Radon is a colorless, odorless and tasteless gas and as such is not easily 
perceptible; 
• A person’s individual home is perceived as safe; 
• Radon is seen as a voluntary rather than an involuntary risk; 
• Cancer is caused by a multitude of reasons including air pollution and 
genetics.  It is difficult to prove that one has developed lung cancer from 
indoor radon pollution; 
• Radon is an example of a chronic rather than an acute risk.  Symptoms 
are not immediately recognized; 
• The risks of radon are not evenly spread—some areas have higher levels 
of radon than others; 
• Radon is seen as a natural hazard rather than a technological one.    
Because of these communication issues few individuals voluntarily test their 
homes for radon (Guimond and Page 1992). 
 
3. Background 
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Since 1988 the Swedish Government asked the National Board of Housing and 
Planning’s to administer the radon reduction fund (Radonbidraget) which has 
been the main tool to reduce radon in homes (Swedish National Board of 
Housing and Planning1988: 372).  In the 2005-2012 time period the budget for 
this fund was set at 33 million SEK per year.  This Government subsidy is used 
to part fund the sanitization of radon contaminated homes.  In order to get the 
houses sanitized, however, the levels of radon in people’s homes first have to be 
measured.  These measurements take at least two months and have to be done 
during the Swedish “heating season” (when a majority of homes are being 
heated as it is cold outside)  lasting from 1st October to 30th April.  If high levels 
of radon are detected, counter measures are introduced to reduce the level of 
radon (such as greater levels of ventilation) and then measurements are taken 
again to see if radon levels have decreased.  For the Swedish National Board of 
Housing and Planning to succeed in reducing the levels of radon in people’s 
homes individuals need to apply for the radon reduction fund once 
measurements have been made. 
 
In 2004 the Swedish National Board of Housing and Planning was concerned 
that only approximately half of the radon subsidy budget had been taken up by 
concerned homeowners per year.  Something needed to be done to increase 
public awareness of radon so as to encourage home owners to measure radon 
levels in their houses and if levels are elevated to get their homes sanitized.   
The Board persuaded the Swedish Government to allow it to spend 5 million 
Swedish crowns as a one-off information/communication campaign (Trivector 
Information 2006).   
 
4. The 2005-2006 radon communication/information campaign 
The Board’s radon campaign was carried out between October 2004 and 
February 2006 (Trivector Information 2006).   That said, it was rather slow to 
get going.  Between October 2004 and May 2005, the radon communication 
working group was busy collecting material for the campaign itself.  In this pre-
phase the most important study was produced by Nordisk Kommunikation 
which was tasked to provide an analysis on how the Swedish National Board of 
Housing should actually communicate the risks associated with radon to the 
general public (Nordisk Kommunikation 2005).   So it was not technically until 
May 2005 that the campaign officially launched. The campaign itself was 
composed of the following: 
• May 2005: Meeting with journalists at the Board’s headquarters in 
Karlskrona; 
• June 2005: A “news note” was sent to all of Sweden’s County Councils 
and municipalities; 
• June 2005: The Board had a meeting with other affected Federal agencies 
regarding the forthcoming radon campaign; 
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• September 2005: A sizeable radon “information package” (containing 
brochures, CD-rom, fridge magnets and posters) was distributed to all of 
Sweden’s municipalities and county councils; 
• September 28th 2005:  A dedicated webpage www.radonguiden.se became 
established and was supposed to serve as the focal risk communication 
mechanism of the campaign.  All the other elements of the campaign 
pushed the Swedish public to visit this website; 
• November 1st  ,2005: One press release is published on radon and the 
importance of measuring radon levels in homes; 
• December 14, 2005: Advertisements about the dangers of radon was 
placed in 12 newspapers with the last advertisement being placed; 
• December 21st- 11th February 2006: Information on the Swedish 
Television’s “Anslagstavlan” which on average is viewed by 190,000 
Swedes; 
 
Following the completion of the radon campaign the Swedish National Board of 
Housing and Planning asked a number of consultancies to evaluate it in the 
Spring of 2006.  The initial findings were rather mixed.  For example, in 247 
face-to-face interviews conducted via convenience sampling in four different 
cities the consultancy Arne Larssen AB found that only 2% of those surveyed 
knew that the Board was behind the newspaper advertisements (the consultancy 
had expected 5%) and that only 1% of those asked would consider visiting the 
radon website (www.radonguiden.se) (Arne Larssen AB 2005).  This was 
confirmed by web analytics which showed that in the period October-December 
2015 the website had only 24,284 unique visits or the equivalent of 264 visitors 
per day.  The average visit time was just over 5 minutes (Jansson 2006).   This 
is comparatively low considering that the target audience for the Board was 2.8 
million individuals (Trivector Information AB 2006).   
 
Strangely enough, none of these rather poor findings affected the outcome of 
the radon communication/information campaign.  The media element of the 
campaign, in part triggered by the advertisements in the local media, but more 
importantly by the active media involvement of the local county council radon 
officers on the back of the campaign, was hugely successful.  The campaign 
was mentioned an astonishing 11 million times in just over a year leading to an 
increasing number of Swedes contacting their municipalities and county 
councils asking for radon measurements (Observer 2006; Trivector Information 
AB 2006).   As Trivector in their meta-analysis consisting of interviews with 
radon officers at various municipalities/country councils uncovered: 
“We have had 5000-6000 (radon) measurements over the years since we 
started measurements in Mora/Orsa municipalities in the beginning of the 
1990s.  And only in the past 6 months during this new measuring season 
we have had more than 1400 measurements—it is an excellent increase.  
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And I have heard the same from other municipalities.” (Trivector 
Information AB 2006, p.26). 
 
Or as another municipal official noted: 
“We see that the Board’s campaign has led to more measurements.  People 
have contacted us and want more measurements.  We had about 765 
measurements conducted under the past season.  The year before that we had 
500.  We think that is rather good.”  (Trivector Information AB 2006). 
 
In other words the Board’s information and communication campaign was a 
huge success primarily because it focused on communication with radon 
officers in local municipalities/county councils via local media.  The Board also 
developed information brochures on what radon was and how to combat it, 
noting among other things that had radon been coloured as a green gas it would 
have been much easier to communicate (SNBHP 2005) something that had been 
highlighted in the radon risk communication research carried out in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Guimond and Page 1992).  What happened after the completion of 
the successful information and communication campaign?  That is discussed in 
the next section. 
 
5. Radon awareness, communication and sanitization post 2004-5 
campaign 
In the period 2006-2014 the total budget for radon sanitization of people’s 
homes was set at 32.8 million SEK per year.  In the period 2006-2010 the 
communication budget for the radon fund was set at 1.5 million SEK per year.  
This budget was consistently underspent.   Partially as a result of this 
underspending the Government further reduced the communication/information 
part of the radon fund to 200,000 SEK per year in the period 2011-2014.   
Unsurprisingly, the Swedish National Board of Housing and Planning 
uncovered that there was a direct correlation between how much funding was 
being spent on communication/information and individuals applying for the 
radon reduction budget.  So the highest level of applications took place in the 
period 2007-2012 (just after the major 5 million SEK 2005 
communication/information campaign) when over 30 million SEK was paid out 
to homeowners per year and since then application levels were reduced by 
almost a third to 22.4 million SEK in 2013 (SNBHP 2014).  As the application 
levels declined further the Swedish National Board of Housing and Planning 
was unable to spend its annual allocated sanitation budget.   
 
This reduction in applications concerned SNBHP.  If the Agency could not 
spend its radon budget, there was a chance that the Government could take the 
budget away from it.  As a result, it decided to conduct two evaluations to better 
understand why applications levels were reduced, one external and one internal. 
7 
 
The external evaluation, carried out by the consultancy CMA Research AB, 
focused on examining knowledge and awareness of radon among certain   target 
groups. When the consultancy asked small house owners who had sanitized 
their homes for radon some 44% of the respondents postulated that small house 
owners were not aware of the risks associated with radon and another 11%  
noted that probably these individuals did not know about the radon reduction 
fund in the first place.  When the question was posed to individuals who had not 
sanitized their homes the figures were 21% and 45% respectively (CMA 2013; 
SNBHP 2014).  
 
The internal evaluation concluded that the communication/ information budget 
part of the radon reduction fund part needed to increase and that the subsidy per 
household originally set at 15,000 SEK was too low and would need to increase 
as well. Based on these two evaluations the Swedish National Board of Housing 
and Planning recommended going forward that the communications/information 
budget should once again increase to 1.5 million SEK per annum and that the 
maximum amount that each individual could apply for should be raised to 
25,000 SEK (SNBHP 2014).  Unfortunately for the Swedish National Board of 
Housing and Planning, however, was that the Swedish Government decided to 
axe the radon reduction fund in its entirety before the Board could publish its 
evaluation.  Hence at the present time the Swedish National Board of Housing 
and Planning has no funds to distribute to individuals who want to sanitize their 
homes from radon.   
 
6. Analysis 
Overall the Swedish National Board for Housing and Planning has done an 
admirable job when it comes to communicating the risks of radon to the general 
public when a large and an appropriate budget has been place (as was the case 
of the 2005-2006 campaign).  When only a small budget was allocated from the 
Radon fund for communication purposes then problems occurred.  With an 
appropriate budget in place communication was a success measured in terms of 
Swedish households seeking the radon subsidy, when it was cut this was no 
longer the case.  That said there are three areas in which the Board needs to 
address when it comes to radon communication 
 
6,1 Reduce the Agency’s reliance on communication consultants 
In analyzing the success of the 2005-6 campaign this author was surprised by 
how reliant the Board was on external communication consultants.  The reports, 
usually based on interviews, media analysis or website analysis were shallow in 
tone with no proper rigorous analysis.  For example, why would only 1% of the 
individuals in the face-to-face survey visit the website?  Questions such as this 
were not analyzed or even discussed.  It is not that radon has been an under 
researched topic academically (as discussed in section 2).  It has been well 
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documented that persuading the public to get their homes tested for radon is 
rather difficult to do including the fact that the public perceive radon to be a 
natural rather than a technological hazard. Had radon gas been associated with 
some form of human made chemical, for example, it would not have been 
difficult to sign up Swedes to get their houses measured (see Slovic 1987; 
2000).  In a way the Board missed an opportunity here.  Rather than to 
commission Nordiskkommunikation to do a study on how radon should be 
communicated they should have commissioned an academic with expertise in 
risk communication to do it.  The campaign, in such a scenario, would have had 
a much more solid academic footing. 
 
6.2 Rushed time frame and no long-term communication strategy 
Although the successful information/communication campaign was supposed to 
last an entire year, in actual fact it lasted no more than 5 months.  That is too 
short and something that Trivector Information also picked up on.  A year-long 
campaign would have been preferable for something as difficult as 
communicating radon advice.   For that to have happened the Board should have 
done all the preparing (brochures, pre-analysis etc) in advance of the launch of 
the campaign.   Related to that it would have been good to see continued 
communication activities post the 2004-2006 campaign as a way to maintain 
momentum and to continue reinforcing the radon risk/measuring messages with 
most of the budget going on promoting local news stories..  Rather in the years 
that followed the Board was unable to spend the funds allocated for radon 
communication.  For example in the period 2006-2010 the Board was allocated 
a budget of 1,5 million SEK a year to spend and in that period it spent (after 
Swedish National Board of Housing and Planning 2014):  
2006-1.36 million SEK 
2007-0.87 million SEK 
2008-0.82 million SEK 
2009-1.04 million SEK 
2010- 0.24million SEK  
 
6.3 Over reliance on the radon website 
The consultancies hired by the Board over promoted the radon website.  The 
aim of all the external communication was too lead concerned homeowners 
back to the website.  This has been done several times before—it happened with 
the Swedish poison fish campaign conducted by the Swedish Food Agency (see 
Lofstedt 2018).  That said it was rather naïve.  The consultancies did not pretest 
their messages nor analyze the possible reasons why the Swedish public would 
not want to visit the website in the first place.  Had they done a proper analysis, 
underpinned by the latest academic literature, they would have realized that 
with regard to radon communication the web site was not the best focus for the 
campaign but rather the “local dimension”.  That is to say rather than contacting 
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“a central station of information” small home owners followed the discussions 
on radon in the local newspapers (as part of the media campaign) in which not 
only the Board was mentioned but also more importantly the individual 
responsible for radon sanitation in that municipality in question. The 
municipality inhabitants felt much more comfortable contacting their 
municipality representatives themselves who had local knowledge of the radon 
problem rather than visiting an anonymous central website.  This was seen in 
the meta analysis and confirmed by earlier research regarding the importance to 
focus on the rich “local landscape, place and identity” as argued by social 
anthropologists and geographers over many years (see, for example: Bender 
1993; Entrikin 1991; Firey 1945; Hirsch and O’Hanlon 1995; Lovell 1998).  
 
  
 
7. What should the Board do now in terms of radon 
communication? 
In 2013 the European Commission passed a Directive on reducing radiation in 
Europe (EU Directive 2013/59).  Each of the member states need to provide a 
reply to the Commission by February 2018 at the latest on how they plan to 
implement that Directive.  In Sweden, the Swedish Radiation Agency is leading 
the nation’s reply to the European Commission and as part of that the Board is 
also involved.  Among the issues stressed in the Directive is the need for a 
proper thought out radiation communication strategy associated with radon.  
Based on this the Swedish National Board of Housing and Planning officials 
take the view that there is a high chance that by 2018 there will be a new 
radiation reduction budget in place as well as a proper communication 
programme.  For that to be successful the Board needs to address the three 
criticisms raised above namely:  
• Any campaign needs to be underpinned by proper risk research and risk 
communication science ideally conducted by an academic body rather 
than by a communication consultancy; 
• Focus on the long-term rather than just do a “snapshot”; 
• Have a strong local dimension rather than attempting to push all the small 
house owners to yet another central webpage; 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
Overall when the Swedish National Board of Housing and Planning has had a 
proper communication/information budget the Board has been successful with 
regard to communicating the risks associated with radon, leading to homes 
being measured and ensuring that individuals apply for up to half the costs 
associated with radon sanitation measures.  When the Board has not had these 
funds it has not been successful.  Going forward with Sweden and the other 
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nations attempting to come to terms with the EU Radiation Directive, it is hoped 
that the Government will set up a new radon sanitation fund. The results of this 
study show how budgets can be better directed to improve campaign 
effectiveness.  In the meantime, what is clear now is that the Board will only 
reach parts of the Government’s generation goal regarding reducing radon set 
out in the important Government Bill of 2001. Schools and larger dwellings will 
meet the Government set radon standards, but single family dwellings will not 
(Swedish Board of Housing and Planning 2009 and 2010b), as there is no radon 
sanitation budget.  As a result, radon pollution in some shape or form will 
continue to cause radon-induced lung cancer in some 500 Swedes per annum 
until new measures are taken. 
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